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The impact of analyst sentiment on UK stock recommendations and target prices 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between narrative sentiment in 
analysts’ company reports and their recommendation and target price outputs. We study an 
industry-balanced sample of 275 UK quoted company sell-side analyst reports over the 
period 2006-2010 using a content analysis methodology to measure net sentiment for a range 
of themes. We then model analysts’ outputs against themed sentiment scores to analyse the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis. We find that themed sentiments impact upon analysts’ 
outputs, but their magnitude and direction vary over the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods. In particular, before the crisis we find a strong negative relationship between the 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment and report outputs, though this effect diminishes 
somewhat with the onset of the crisis, to be restored thereafter. Growth sentiment exerts a 
weak positive impact before the crisis which disappears thereafter. Financial performance 
sentiment becomes a significant positive driver of outputs following the crisis. There is 
evidently a ‘back to basics’ approach following the crisis which restores financial 
fundamentals to the heart of stock analysis. Our findings provide some insight into the 
thought processes of analysts by identifying the dynamic relation between analysts’ outputs 
and themed sentiments. 
 
Keywords:  analyst recommendations; target price; sentiment; content analysis; financial 
crisis 
  
2 
 
The impact of analyst sentiment on UK stock recommendations and target prices 
 
1. Introduction 
   The primary aim of our paper is to investigate the relationship between the narrative 
sentiment in analysts’ company reports and the recommendation and target price outputs 
produced by their authors for a given stock. In so doing, we provide some insight into the 
thought processes of such analysts in relation to the gathering, analysis, and evaluation of 
company stock information.  
   Analysts’ reports are an essential tool in the operation of equity markets, providing an 
important information channel, increasing information efficiency and ultimately the speed at 
which public information is incorporated into share prices. Such reports bring together a 
range of equity investment analysis techniques in a structured manner so that the reader, 
whether an individual investor or a professional fund manager, can make a more informed 
stock investment decision. The literature on analysts’ reports has grown significantly over the 
last two decades, with seminal contributions from authors such as Schipper (1991) who 
focuses on earnings forecasts and analysts’ decision processes and Ramnath et al. (2008) who 
provide a far more detailed taxonomy of studies regarding the role of analysts in financial 
markets. 
   In this paper we examine the relationship between two key analysts’ outputs, target prices 
and recommendations, and the themes and tonality (themed sentiment) of the narrative that 
analysts produce in company stock reports, drawing upon advances in content analysis. We 
also take into account the possibility that the effect of themed sentiment on analysts’ outputs 
is contingent upon the state of the wider macroeconomic environment by examining these 
inputs and outputs before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis. 
   There has been a strong focus of financial analyst research on the production and capital 
market impact (informativeness) of earnings forecasts (Landsman and Maydew, 2002). There 
is evidence that such forecasts contribute to the information reflected in future annual reports 
(Anderson et al., 2007), that they play both an information discovery and interpretative role 
(Chen et al., 2010), and that they contain significant macroeconomic information (Hann et 
al., 2012). In this paper we focus on analysts’ target prices and recommendations both 
individually and when taken together. Ryan and Taffler (2006) and Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006) find that share prices react significantly to recommendation changes, with the latter 
study evidencing a greater reaction to new sell than to new buy recommendations. However, 
Bradshaw (2002) finds that the majority of the reports they study justify recommendations 
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with target prices, and that higher target prices are associated with more favourable stock 
recommendations. Evidence shows that analysts’ reports are more informative when analysts 
arguments are stronger (Hirst et al., 1995), when potential brokerage profits are higher and 
when processing costs are lower (Frankel et al., 2006), when the annual report is complex 
(Lehavy et al., 2011), and in bad times with greater uncertainty (Loh and Stultz, 2014). These 
findings indicate that analysts’ reports provide valuable information to the market and that 
the nature and the precise impact of this information is dependent on factors ranging from 
external factors, analyst information processing ability, and analyst characteristics and biases.  
   The process followed by analysts has been a significant focus in the literature, though it is 
recognised that it remains something of a ‘black box’ (Bradshaw, 2011), with academics 
instead examining correlations between inputs (stock prices and fundamental information), 
outputs (earnings forecasts and recommendations), and conditioning variables to understand 
this process. Bouwman and Frishkoff (1987) examine the decision-making processes of 
analysts in a novel experimental setting, using protocol analysis. Much of the process is 
geared towards target price determination, with analysts tending to focus on simpler rather 
than more developed methods (Block, 1999; DeFond and Hung, 2003), though Imam et al. 
(2008) observe evidence of an increasing emphasis on more complex models, leading to 
greater target price accuracy (Demirakos et al., 2010).  
   Content analysis research in the accounting and finance field has grown significantly in 
importance in recent years, with comprehensive reviews on corporate disclosures provided by 
Li (2010), the broader finance field provided by Kearney and Liu (2014), and the broader 
financial reporting information environment provided by Beyer et al. (2010). In the analyst 
reports discipline, many studies tend to focus on the makeup of such reports, and in particular 
the analysis of financial statement figures (Previts et al., 1994; Govindarajan, 1980; Breton 
and Taffler, 2001; Amir et al., 2003; Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006; García-Meca and 
Martínez, 2007) and earnings quality (Barker and Imam, 2008). Other studies concern the 
attention paid by analysts to non-financial information (Previts et al., 1994; Breton and 
Taffler, 2001; Orens and Lybaert, 2007) and the firm and market factors that drive this 
(Campbell and Slack, 2007; Orens and Lybaert, 2010; Coram et al., 2011). 
   There is a growing body of research on the impact of tone or sentiment on asset prices and 
returns. Examples include Tetlock et al. (2008) and Garcia (2013) who find evidence of 
financial media sentiment impacting on US stock returns, Boukus and Rosenberg (2006) who 
show that Federal Open Market Committee minutes impact on US Treasury yields, and 
Hanley and Hoburg (2010) who study US IPOs and find that greater informative content 
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reduces under-pricing. Studies find that higher quality disclosure, conservatism and 
readability reduce the probability of litigation risk (Mohan, 2007; Rogers et al., 2011). 
   The importance of narrative commentary in analysts’ reports is well documented in the 
literature (Asquith et al., 2005; Barton and Mercer, 2005; Huang et al., 2010). Both the detail 
and tonality of analysts’ reports have incremental information content, and investor reaction 
to analyst reports is more pronounced when the reports are more complex (Twedt and Rees, 
2012). Huang et al. (2010) find that analyst report narrative reflects the favourableness of a 
stock conveyed by quantitative output signals including recommendations, target prices and 
earnings forecasts. Evidence from Huang et al. underlines the incremental information value 
of analyst report narrative in explaining firm values, and they find that investors react twice 
as much to negative analysts’ opinions as they do to positive opinions. Thus, the extant 
research reveals that not only are analysts’ target prices and recommendations informative to 
capital markets, but so too is the narrative which accompanies these key outputs. 
   In this study we examine the themed sentiment of analyst reports to assess whether there is 
a link between the sentiment related to the themes and the outputs of analyst reports, and 
further, whether this relationship strengthens or diminishes in response to changing 
macroeconomic conditions. We study 275 sell-side analyst reports between January 2006 and 
December 2010. We separate our sample into three periods, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis, 
and use content analysis to separate the analyst reports into six pre-determined themes. To do 
this we develop our own theme dictionary by using a training sample of 84 out-of-sample 
reports. To measure the sentiment in these themes we use the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial 
dictionary and a version of this dictionary that is adapted to a financial context by Loughran 
and McDonald (2011). 
   In our univariate analysis, we find that around 80 percent of the content of analysts’ reports 
concerns financial performance, the industry and market environment, growth and the 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. During and following the crisis we see an 
increasing focus on the macroeconomic and regulatory environment themes, but a decreasing 
emphasis on the growth and management and strategy themes. However, the sentiment 
related to these latter two themes has not changed significantly over the study periods. For all 
the other themes, we observe more negative sentiment with the onset of the crisis, followed in 
general by reversal thereafter. 
  We hypothesise that the themed sentiment in analysts’ reports should be consistent with the 
outputs they produce, and we expect to see some evolution in the strength of themes over the 
crisis period. Our multivariate model results provide a more complex picture than we might 
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expect from theory. Across all of our model specifications we find a strong negative 
relationship between the macroeconomic and regulatory environment and the report outputs, 
though this effect is partially reversed during the crisis to give an insignificant effect. In 
contrast, before the crisis we see a positive impact of growth sentiment which disappears 
during the crisis period and thereafter. There is some limited evidence that management and 
strategy sentiment exerts a negative impact during the crisis which dissipates in the post-
crisis period. The industry and market environment appears to have little association with 
analysts’ outputs. Finally, following the financial crisis, we see a marked increase in focus on 
financial performance sentiment, with a positive association with analysts’ outputs. 
   In our additional analyses, when we explore the deviation of recommendations and target 
price premia from consensus, we find qualitatively similar results, except that 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment sentiment is positively associated with the 
deviation from consensus recommendation though has no impact on the deviation from 
consensus target premium. Further, we estimate a series of additional specifications, 
including separating positive and negative sentiment scores, controlling for industry type, and 
employing rank scores and standardised scores, though we find that the results are 
qualitatively similar to those arising from our main models.  
   Drawing from the previous literature, there is established evidence that as well as the 
quantitative outputs, the qualitative attributes of analyst reports such as tone and detail 
provide incremental information content to the market. It is therefore important to provide 
evidence on how analysts’ outputs (stock recommendations and target prices) and the themed 
sentiment in analyst report narrative, are interrelated. Our paper seeks to contribute to the 
analysts’ report literature by addressing this issue and seeks to provide evidence on whether 
the outputs and the qualitative content that justifies the outputs remain stable or vary over 
changing market conditions. Building on the work of Breton and Taffler (2001), we include 
the theme categories developed in this earlier work but also add a new macroeconomic and 
regulatory environment variable, recognising that not only do the firm-specific and industry 
level environments impact upon analysts’ outputs, but so too does the wider macroeconomic 
environment to which all firms are subject. A further innovation is that we explicitly allow 
for changing market conditions rather than assuming that the impact of the external 
environment on the analyst’s report is stationary across all states of the economy, in contrast 
to studies such as Breton and Taffler, Asquith et al. (2005), and Twedt and Rees (2012). We 
study three periods, including the crisis, across which we seek to understand the change in 
analysts’ focus when determining their investment outputs for a stock. Building upon the 
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existing literature, we expect that analysts’ narrative sentiment will map less clearly on to 
report outputs during a period of economic volatility due to behavioural influences which 
may make analysts less effective and their forecast accuracy poorer. We contribute to the 
literature concerning analysts’ reports during the crisis, not by only examining analysts’ 
outputs (Ke and Yu, 2009; Ang and Ma, 2001; Loh and Mian, 2003; Sidhu and Tan, 2011; 
Loh and Stulz, 2014), but also by modelling the sentiment themes that drive those outputs.  
   An important finding of our study is that the narrative concerning the external environment 
diminishes in its effect on analysts’ outputs during the crisis to be restored thereafter, while 
the narrative relating to financial fundamentals emerges as a key driver following the crisis, 
suggesting a ‘back to basics’ approach to analysis in response to the shock. A more indirect 
contribution of our paper is to provide further insight to the analysts’ bias literature. Analysts 
who provide unfavourable investment advice on a stock which is quantifiable and observable 
by market participants might balance or temper this in their narrative in order to stay on good 
terms with management. On the other hand, analysts who give favourable investment advice 
on a stock might also use their narrative to communicate critical risk factors in order to 
protect their reputation in the event of that advice proving to be inaccurate. 
   The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and section 3 
discusses the analyst report data sample, as well as the content analysis and econometric 
methods applied. Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 provides additional analyses 
and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the general results arising from our analysis and 
concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Theory context 
   This paper adopts the approach of Breton and Taffler (2001) to explore the relationship 
between the tone of language used and the themes employed to justify stock 
recommendations. Previous research suggests that market reaction to analysts’ 
recommendations increases with the strength of the argument justifying the recommendation 
(Asquith et al., 2005; Twedt and Rees, 2012). Therefore, investors read analysts’ reports to 
derive incremental economic information about companies from their commentary. Thus, 
consistent with Breton and Taffler, we expect that analysts carefully choose their language 
when generating report outputs, and that there is a relationship between the themed sentiment 
in analyst reports and stock recommendations. 
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   We also test whether themed sentiment exhibits a similar relationship with target price 
premia (defined as the difference between target price and current market price scaled by 
current market price). Target price premia arguably provide a more precise and continuous 
measure than rather coarse stock recommendations (Huang et al., 2009). For example, stocks 
with both high and low positive premia may be treated as a buy recommendation, while the 
former clearly offer a higher expected return to investors. Within the same recommendation 
category, analyst narrative can express a stronger tone for companies with higher target 
premia. Indeed, Brav and Lehavy (2003) find that target price revisions provide significant 
incremental information over stock recommendations, while Huang et al. (2009) find that a 
trading strategy that combines both recommendations and target price premia outperforms a 
strategy that relies on recommendations or target price premia alone. Furthermore, Kerl et al. 
(2012) find that recommendation changes are driven largely by events concerning company 
strategy and business development, in addition to market trends, whereas target price changes 
are triggered more by information on company management and the operating environment. 
Therefore, we expect to observe differences in the relationship between the themed 
sentiments in our study and analyst recommendations and target premia outputs, with the 
latter capturing more modelled variability. 
   Analysts’ target price premia and stock recommendations are contingent upon the market 
prices of the companies they analyse. If an analyst believes that a company can generate good 
future financial performance and growth then the target price set should be higher, though if 
this sentiment is shared by investors then the market price will also increase, leaving little 
upside potential to exploit. The role of analysts is to identify stocks that are mispriced and to 
write a commentary justifying this position which is in general then reflected in a target price 
and recommendation on a stock. As information intermediaries, the role of analysts is to 
forecast firm potential over a longer term horizon, while investors may be affected by 
changes in market sentiment over a shorter horizon. Therefore, analysts’ views may at times 
contrast with market sentiment and expectations which can in turn lead to optimistic or 
pessimistic forecasts.  
   Prior research evidences this issue and finds that analysts exhibit a tendency towards 
optimism in their forecasts and recommendations. Walther and Willis (2013) find that analyst 
forecasts are the most optimistic and inaccurate when investor sentiment peaks. They define 
investor sentiment as “an overly favorable or unfavorable view about stocks in general that is 
unwarranted given fundamentals” (p.208). Hann et al. (2012) find a significant association 
between aggregate earnings forecasts errors and real GDP growth forecast revisions, 
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suggesting that analysts under-react to negative macroeconomic news. Further, they find that 
market (investor) reaction to earnings announcements is more negative than that of analysts 
following weaker macroeconomic news which suggests a difference between analyst and 
investor sentiment dynamics. The bias of optimism may be due to the asymmetric loss 
function facing analysts (Clatworthy et al., 2012), the augmented career prospects and access 
to firm management of optimistic analysts (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Francis et al., 1997; 
Mikhail et al., 1999; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Mayew, 2008; Beyer et al., 2010), or the 
maximisation of trading commissions and other corporate services (Lin and McNichols, 
1998; Beyer et al., 2010). An optimism bias in analysts’ outputs is compounded by a similar 
bias in annual report and other corporate information arising from management performance 
attribution bias (Aerts, 2001; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003), and positive impression 
management (Hooghiemstra, 2010), though markets reward corporate transparency and 
increased risk disclosure (Kothari et al., 2009; Kravet and Muslu, 2013).  
   In contrast, other research shows that analysts desire to maintain their credibility by issuing 
conservative forecasts (Brown et al., 2014). Cowen et al. (2006) show that analysts that work 
at ‘full service banks’ issue less optimistic earnings forecasts and recommendations 
compared to analysts in other firm types, especially in brokerage houses. Such conservative 
analysts generate a greater impact on stock returns (Hugon and Muslu, 2010). 
    In the next section we present the hypotheses of this study. Even though we expect internal 
consistency in the analysts’ reports and expect the themed sentiment to inform the 
recommendations and target price premia, and thereby state hypotheses consistent with 
theory, we may in practice observe relations between certain themes and analyst report 
outputs which are contrary to expectations and potentially driven by state-contingent 
dynamics. 
 
2.2 Themed sentiments 
   We define six major themes in this paper, similar to those in Breton and Taffler (2001), 
though with the addition of a theme which captures the macroeconomic and regulatory 
environment. Given its impact on financial markets during the recent crisis, the purpose of 
this additional theme is to gauge how analysts incorporate changing economic environment 
conditions into their commentary to justify their stock recommendations and target prices.  
   The first two of our themes relate to the external environment of the company, and they 
concern macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, and the industry and market environment. 
Analysis of the external environment is an essential component of the equity analyst’s 
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research as favourable changes in this environment improve the outlook for growth in 
earnings and future cash flows, whereas unfavourable changes cause a deterioration in such 
flows and/or increasing discount rates. Breton and Taffler (2001) do not find a significant 
impact of industry and market conditions on buy/hold/sell recommendations, but after 
dropping the hold category they find that fewer mentions of negative market conditions lead 
to a buy recommendation. Therefore our general expectation is as follows: 
H1: External environment (including industry and market, and macroeconomic and 
regulatory environment) sentiment has a positive association with stock recommendations 
and target price premia. 
   Our third theme is growth which we define as any action that is intended to increase 
company operating capacity. Mergers, acquisitions, capital expenditures, and strategic 
investments are all included in this category. Favourable growth sentiment is likely to have a 
positive association with both stock prices and target price premia. Analysts tend to focus on 
growth as a key parameter in their stock valuation methodologies and therefore reflect it 
rapidly in both target prices and recommendations. After all, it drives both horizon cash flows 
and the terminal value multiplier. Fogarty and Rogers (2005) document that analyst narrative 
is predominantly positive about growth-related plans, and more specifically they find that 
positive comments about mergers are 13 times as frequent as negative comments. However, 
Breton and Taffler (2001) do not find a significant relationship between growth sentiment 
and recommendations. We hypothesise that growth sentiment has a positive association with 
analyst stock investment advice:  
H2: Growth sentiment has a positive association with stock recommendations and target 
price premia. 
   Our fourth theme, management and strategy, attempts to capture the sentiment of analysts 
in relation to management actions and the strategy they set in order to compete and generate 
shareholder value. Previous research shows that analysts rely upon information supplied by 
management (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005) and that they prefer direct personal contact with a 
subject company to standard information releases (Barker, 1998). Furthermore, Breton and 
Taffler (2001) find that the more approving and neutral references are to company 
management and strategy in analyst report narratives, the more likely is a buy 
recommendation. In contrast to Breton and Taffler, we do not split sentiment into positive, 
neutral and negative, but instead examine net themed sentiment so are unable to replicate 
their results with the same degree of granularity. However, we can argue, more broadly, that 
more positive sentiment in relation to management and strategy reflects more favourable 
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analyst narrative analysis concerning management acumen and strategic direction. Intuitively, 
this should in turn lead to a greater stock price premium and likelihood of a buy 
recommendation on a given stock: 
H3: Management and strategy sentiment has a positive association with stock 
recommendations and target price premia. 
   Our final two themes relate to the financial statements. Favourable sentiment in relation to 
key firm fundamentals should give rise to a significant positive impact upon stock price 
premia and stock recommendations. Stronger company performance leads to greater current 
and future cash flows which in turn should lead to growing stock values. However, stock 
value growth is also contingent upon the risk to those cash flows, an important indication of 
which can be observed in balance sheet strength. The soundness of the balance sheet, in terms 
of the balance of assets, liabilities and capital, enables the analyst to gauge financial distress 
risk going forward, and whether it might arise through liquidity or solvency problems. A 
positive earnings outlook accompanied by a more approving discussion of balance sheet 
strength should lead to a greater likelihood of both a buy recommendation and a higher target 
price premium. Breton and Taffler (2001) find a positive relationship between favourable 
commentary on financial performance and stock recommendations, though they fail to find 
an impact of financial position sentiment. We therefore state the following hypothesis: 
H4: Financial statement (financial position and performance) sentiment has a positive 
association with stock recommendations and target price premia. 
 
2.3 Period effects 
   We study three periods in our empirical study – the pre-crisis period, the crisis period and 
the post-crisis period, across which we seek to understand the change in analyst focus when 
determining their investment outputs for a stock. Previous studies on the narrative content of 
analysts’ reports focus on relatively stable or bull markets, including Breton and Taffler 
(2001) who examine the period 1989-1990, Asquith et al. (2005) who study the period 1997-
1999, and Twedt and Rees (2012) who examine the year 2006. Previts et al. (1994) collect 
their reports from the three distinct periods of the 1987 stock market crash, the early 1990s 
US recession, and subsequent bull market period, though they do not discuss the impact of 
period differences on the use of narrative themes by analysts.  
   The skills and judgement of analysts are arguably most challenged in times of market 
volatility and in particular during and following financial crises. Ke and Yu (2009) find that 
the effectiveness with which analysts translate their earnings forecasts into recommendations 
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is lower when investor sentiment is extreme (when there are large swings in investor 
sentiment). Ang and Ma (2001) find that analysts failed to anticipate underlying firm 
weaknesses before the Asian Financial Crisis and to make appropriate adjustments as the 
crisis hit. Further, Loh and Mian (2003) find that Singaporean analysts’ earnings forecasts 
during the Asian financial crisis were systematically optimistic, and that analysts’ earnings 
forecast changes exceeded actual earnings changes, and did not incorporate negative 
earnings-related news. However, Sidhu and Tan (2011) find that analysts sharply revised 
earnings forecast levels downwards in response to the Global Financial Crisis, tending 
towards over-pessimism, though observed an upward trend in buy recommendations 
thereafter as stocks had greater upside price potential. Loh and Stulz (2014) find that during 
crises and recessions, analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy deteriorates. However, during 
these times analyst research becomes more influential in that their recommendation changes 
and earnings forecast revisions generate a greater market response when compared to normal 
periods. Thus, there is some prima facie evidence that investors rely more on analysts’ 
guidance during times of economic uncertainty. 
   These studies indicate that during volatile market events, analysts are less effective, their 
forecast accuracy deteriorates, and report outputs are reactionary and lag behind market 
changes. Drawing upon these empirical findings, we might expect that analysts’ commentary 
is also subject to behavioural change, and thus narrative sentiment will map less clearly on to 
report outputs during the crisis. We therefore expect that the association between report 
outputs and analyst narrative sentiment will be diminished during the crisis, to then be 
restored thereafter:  
H5: The association between themed sentiment and stock recommendations and target 
premia diminishes during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
 
3. Sample and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
  This study focuses on UK quoted companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and 
drawn from the FTSE 350 index. We examine sell-side analyst reports for a panel of 57 
companies drawn from 14 non-financial sectors, as presented in Table 1. Our sample 
selection process starts with identifying the weights of the 14 sectors in FTSE 350. We then 
rank each company within its respective industry based on its market capitalisation, and 
download analyst reports for that company from the Thomson Reuters Investext database.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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   We aim to collect a total of six analysts’ reports for each company, two reports for each of 
the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. We capture all reports that are longer than 15 
pages in length and are produced within the period January 2006 to December 2010. 
Consistent with Barker and Imam (2008), we restrict our sample to reports exceeding 15 
pages in order to focus on those that provide a more comprehensive analysis of the subject 
companies, in preference to short research notes or updates which often contain limited 
narrative discussion. We eliminate reports that: (i) are shorter than 15 pages; (ii) do not 
present a clear recommendation and a target price; or (iii) present analysis for multiple 
companies in the same report. To minimise the effects of variation in the report styles of 
different brokerage houses, we capture reports from as wide a range of investment banks as 
possible. After eliminating the reports that do not fit our sample criteria, our final sample is 
reduced from 342 to 275 reports. Table 2 provides information on the distribution of the 
reports and companies across the brokerage houses. Around 85% of the reports are produced 
by the nine largest brokerage houses which is to be expected as they have the resources 
required to cover a wider range of stocks. There is an average of between one and two reports 
for each company per brokerage house.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
   For the purposes of the study, we distinguish three periods: the pre-crisis period, the 
(within) crisis period, and the post-crisis period. To ascertain these periods in terms of date 
ranges we identify periods of advance, decline and recovery based on the FTSE100 index 
(within which most of the companies are positioned). Based on this analysis, the pre-crisis 
reports are drawn from the period January 2006 to March 2007, the crisis period reports from 
June 2007 to March 2009, and the post-crisis reports from September 2009 to December 
2010. We leave two months between pre-crisis and crisis, and five months between crisis and 
post-crisis periods to allow for analysts adjusting to the changing market regimes. Whilst this 
appears a somewhat imprecise approach, it is based upon share price which is arguably the 
most sensitive of equity market metrics. We recognise that there is some debate concerning 
the precise date of commencement and end of the Global Financial Crisis. Defining the pre-
crisis period as ending in early 2007 and the crisis commencing in mid-2007 is consistent 
with Cecchettie (2008), Ivanisha and Scharfstein (2008), Buiter (2009), Loh and Stulz (2014), 
and the NBER, and defining the crisis period as ending in early 2009 and the post crisis 
commencing in later 2009 is consistent with Kacperczyk and Schabl (2009) and Balakrishnan 
et al. (2014). Some authors see the early signs of the crisis appearing as early as 2006 
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(Doogar et al., 2014), and ending as early as 2008 (Erkens et al., 2012), though these studies 
tend to focus on financial sector firms and the subprime aspect of the crisis. 
   From the sample of 275 reports, 78 reports relate to the pre-crisis period, 93 reports to the 
crisis period, and 104 reports to the post-crisis period. Table 3 displays the recommendation 
structure for each period in panel A, the change in the recommendations in panel B, and the 
change in target prices in panel C. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
   In our sample, approximately 59% of the reports give buy recommendations and 10% 
reports give sell recommendations1. Our finding of a buy/sell ratio of 5.75 times is within the 
range evidenced in the existing literature which finds a buy/sell ratio of between 3.6 times 
(Imam et al., 2008) and 7.6 times (Barber et al., 2001). Further, Balboa et al. (2008) study 
UK analyst recommendations between 1994 and 2006, and observe 50.5% buy, 37.1% hold, 
and 12.4% sell recommendations, again consistent with the distribution in our sample. When 
we divide our sample into sub-periods, we observe that during the crisis period there was a 
decline of around 6 percentage points in reports with a buy recommendation and an increase 
in sell recommendation reports of 4 percentage points. Hold recommendations remained 
roughly the same during the crisis with only a 2 percentage point increase. In the post-crisis 
period there was a marked increase in buy recommendations of around 17 percentage points, 
with buy recommendations approximately 11 percentage points higher when compared with 
the pre-crisis period. Hold and sell recommendations also declined markedly in this latter 
period when compared with the pre-crisis period2. Thus, in the post-crisis period, analysts 
were evidently more optimistic about the upside potential of the stocks followed than before 
the crisis, and viewed stocks as in general undervalued at that point in time. 
   Panels B presents changes in stock recommendations over the study period3. Across the 
whole sample, around 75% of the reports reiterate the previous recommendation. However, 
upgrades decrease by around 12 percentage points during the crisis and then subsequently 
increase by around 8 percentage points following the crisis. The opposite trend is observed in 
relation to recommendation downgrades: an increase of around 5 percentage points during the 
1 We classify the reports with a positive recommendation such as buy, overweight, outperform and add under the 
buy category, reports with a neutral recommendation such as hold, equalweight, marketperform and neutral 
under the hold category, and reports with a negative recommendation such as sell, underperform, underweight 
and reduce under the sell category. 
2 To check whether analysts forecasted the crisis at the start of 2007, we eliminate reports from 2007 but 
observe no discernible difference in the recommendation structure. 
3 These changes are computed in relation to the previous recommendation given by the same analyst (brokerage 
house) for a given company. 
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crisis and then a decline of around 8 percentage points following the crisis. Panel C reveals 
that whilst the majority of the reports reiterate a recommendation, analysts are generally 
positively disposed towards companies when target price changes are considered4. Indeed, 
target prices are revised upwards in approximately 70% of reports both before and after the 
crisis. A similarly symmetrical distribution is observed before and after the crisis with 
reiterated and downgraded target prices. However, the crisis period itself shows a rather 
different picture: the proportion of reports with upgraded target prices declined to around 
39% during this period and downgrades increased to around 34%. 
   Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and t-statistic tests to enable the comparison of target 
price premia before, during and after the crisis. The mean target price premium increased 
markedly during the crisis, and remained at this higher level during the post-crisis period. The 
differences between the crisis and post-crisis versus the pre-crisis period are significant, 
though there is no significant difference between crisis and post-crisis premia.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Content analysis 
   In this paper we conduct a content (textual) analysis of the narrative in analysts’ stock 
reports to measure the impact of themed sentiment on stock recommendations and target 
price premia. Content analysis is defined as “any technique for making inferences by 
systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1968, 
p.68). By sentiment we refer to textual sentiment which Kearney and Liu (2014) define as 
“the degree of positivity or negativity in texts” (p.172), otherwise known as ‘tone’, and by 
themes we refer to “clusters of words with different meanings or connotations” (Weber, 
1990, p.37). The content analysis literature focuses on the narratives produced by firms, 
analysts, and others. Such an approach is valuable in the context of empirical research in the 
finance field as it aids the researcher in the investigation of different types or “levels” of 
communication as defined by the meanings of the words employed (Kothari et al., 2009).  
   The stock reports are downloaded in pdf format, converted into plain text, and then 
uploaded to the QSR NVivo 9 content analysis software package. Consistent with Breton and 
Taffler (2001), we choose not to include report tables or figures in our analysis as analysts 
4 These changes are computed in relation to the previous target price produced by a given analyst (brokerage 
house) for that company. Please note that sample size reduced in this table due to the previous target prices 
being omitted in 8 reports. 
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provide commentary on them in their narrative anyway. We conduct the textual analysis by: 
(i) identifying themes as well as sentences that contain these themes to form our text units, in 
order to calculate thematic variable scores; and then (ii) counting the positive and negative 
words in sentences to derive tonality scores for each theme. 
 
Thematic variable scores 
   In order to calculate the thematic variable scores, we first construct a theme dictionary, a 
critical element of our approach as the sentiment scores for each theme are fundamental to 
our research design. It is important to carefully identify words which are both meaningful and 
which capture the associated text units. 
   We define six major equity analysis themes in this paper on the basis of a synthesis of the 
approaches of Breton and Taffler (2001), Abdolmohammadi et al. (2006), Orens and Lybaert 
(2010), and innovations of our own analysis. Table 5 illustrates the themes, along with the 
number of keywords identified and examples of keywords and phrases associated with each 
theme.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
   To identify the keywords for each theme, we examine 84 out-of-sample reports, two for 
each of the 14 industries and the three periods of our study. We choose not to include our test 
sample in our final sample to avoid bias of fit in our final results. We conduct a word 
frequency query for this sub-sample to derive a technical word set typically employed within 
analyst stock reports. This query commenced with approximately 7,000 non-numerical 
keywords that are longer than two letters which are then sorted on the basis of frequency of 
appearance, and from which the top 1,000 words are selected. To illustrate, the most common 
keyword is “growth” which appears 1,169 times, and the least common word is “jobs” which 
appears only six times. We then make an initial classification of these words into the six 
themes, eliminating any words that cannot be assigned, thereby reducing the list to 432 
keywords. We proceed to search for these thematic keywords within the full sample of 
reports. The results are manually validated and keywords that do not capture the intended 
meaning are either reclassified or deleted, whilst also adding different variations of the 
keywords to capture further thematic meaning. For example, the keyword “credit” might be 
used to describe financial position as in “credit facility” or might be used in a broader 
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economic sense as in “credit crunch”. The thematic dictionary thus yields 621 words or 
phrases5. 
   The next stage of our approach is to search for the thematic keywords within the text of 
each report in our sample and then classify each sentence by theme. The score for each 
thematic variable for each report is as follows 
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
(1) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the number of words in a sentence that contains a keyword from each theme, 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the total number of words in the text6. If a sentence contains more than one 
defined keyword category, we classify that sentence into each category that applies. 
  To check whether the theme dictionaries capture the intended meaning we conduct both a 
manual and an automated text analysis for the purposes of comparison. We draw a sample of 
27 analysts’ reports from our final study sample, manually code each report, and then 
calculate the thematic scores for each. We then compare these manual scores with the 
computer coded results and calculate Cronbach’s alpha both for the aggregate coding and for 
each theme separately. Cronbach’s alpha measures how well a dataset measures an 
underlying construct. An aggregate Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.940 shows that, overall, our 
manual and computer coding results are highly consistent. For each separate theme we 
compute Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from a high of 0.904 (financial position) to a low 
of 0.736 (management and strategy), with the remaining themes are all higher than 0.80. The 
scores exceed the generally acceptable 0.70 threshold and are comparable to other studies in 
accounting and finance (Elshandidy and Neri, 2014; Elshandidy, et al., 2014; Abraham and 
Cox, 2007; Botosan, 1997).   
 
Sentiment scores 
   We then proceed to compute thematic sentiment scores. To achieve this, we search for 
positive and negative keywords in our sample to determine word frequency scores. Here, we 
use keywords that are based upon the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial dictionary (and General 
Inquirer software) which is commonly used in content analysis in the accounting and finance 
field (Kothari et al., 2009; Tetlock et al., 2008). However Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
5 In our study, the maximum number of words in a phrase is three, as in “like for like”. 
6 For example, in a given analyst report, if there are 10 sentences that contain keywords relating to financial 
performance and if these sentences have a total of 80 words then NW = 80. We then divide this by the total 
number of words in a report; if a report has 1,000 words then we compute a thematic variable score of 0.08. 
17 
 
                                                 
find that some of the negative keywords in the Harvard dictionary are not necessarily 
negative in a financial context, and they modify the negative keyword list in the Harvard 
dictionary to better reflect the tone in financial text. There is an increasing preference for the 
Loughran and McDonald (LM) dictionary in finance research; for example, Rogers et al. 
(2011) use this revised dictionary to measure the impact of disclosure tone on shareholder 
litigation, Garcia (2013) to measure sentiment in financial news, and Huang et al. (2014) use 
it to analyse how investors react to abnormal tone in earnings press releases. We therefore 
employ both the Harvard-IV-4 positive and negative words list and the LM lists in the 
measurement of sentiment scores for the sake of completeness. The net sentiment score for 
each category is simply the difference between the frequency of positive and negative words 
as follows 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 =  𝑃𝑃 − 𝑁𝑁
𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
 
(2) 
where 𝑃𝑃 is the frequency of positive keywords and 𝑁𝑁 is the frequency of negative keywords 
in sentences that contain thematic keywords within each report, and 𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the total word 
count in each report. 
 
3.2.2 Research design 
   We estimate two types of model in our analysis: (i) an ordinal regression to examine the 
impact of themed sentiments, periods and their interaction effects on the buy, hold and sell 
recommendation given by analysts; and (ii) an ordinary least squares regression of the target 
price premium on the same set of independent variables.  
   Model 1 examines the drivers of analysts’ stock recommendations as detailed on the front 
or tear-sheet of a stock report. The recommendations are coded as follows: 2 = “buy”; 1 = 
“hold”; and 0 = “sell”, thereby converting a text-based variable into a quantitative ordinal 
variable. The model enables us to estimate the relationship between the ordinal dependent 
variable, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, the probability of the recommendation category, and the six themed sentiments. 
We employ dummies to control for period (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) with the pre-
crisis period as the default time period. 
   In our ordinal model, for each case 𝑒𝑒, the following equation describes the explanatory 
index, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, that influences the probability of various states: 
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𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖   +𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)  + 𝛽𝛽10(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽12(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖)  +𝛽𝛽13(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽14(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽15(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽16(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽17(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽18(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽19(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)  +𝛽𝛽20(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖4𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖     (3) 
     
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the probability of a buy/hold/sell recommendation, 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is industry 
and market environment sentiment; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is management and strategy sentiment; 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is macroeconomic environment sentiment; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖 is growth sentiment; 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is financial position sentiment; and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is financial performance sentiment. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 and  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 equal one during the crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively, 
and equal zero otherwise. Interaction dummies are identified by terms containing an asterisk. 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 are firm level control variables. We compute the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) to control for firm size, the price to book ratio (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) to control for 
growth opportunities and unrecorded goodwill, the return on common equity (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) to 
control for performance, and total debt to equity (𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) to control for leverage.  
      Model 2 examines the drivers of the target premium, using the same set of independent 
variables as in model 1. Here, we attempt to determine the factors that drive the degree of 
upside (or target premium) as measured in Equation 4: 
𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 = 𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  
(4) 
   Model 2 thus estimates in turn the relationship between the target premium and the six 
themed sentiments, period dummies, and interaction effects. The model is obtained by 
replacing 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 with 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in Equation 3. For both models we first report the sentiment with 
control variables specification and period dummies, and then a specification which also 
includes the interaction effects. In both models, z-statistics (t-statistics) are calculated using 
White robust standard errors and are clustered by company to control for dependency in error 
terms. 
   A further specification of Model 2 is obtained by including the stock recommendation as an 
additional control variable. This specification captures the impact of sentiment on target 
premia that is not captured by stock recommendations. 
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4.  Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
   Table 6 presents the frequency of words by theme within the text units as a proportion of 
the overall report word count (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 in Equation 1). On average, sentences that give 
reference to financial performance and the industry and market environment account for more 
than half of the analyst reports. The ranking observed in our data is consistent with the 
findings of Breton and Taffler (2001) where these themes account for the majority (67%) of 
theme words.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
   Breakdown of these results by period reveals that reference to these two themes, along with 
the financial position theme, is not significantly different across the three periods of our 
study. Therefore, it is evident that analysts consistently focus upon the industry and market 
environment and financial accounting information in their reports. Commentary relating to 
the macroeconomic and regulatory environment increased significantly with the onset of the 
financial crisis and persisted thereafter, with an insignificant change between the crisis and 
post-crisis periods, indicating a persistent shift in analysts’ decision frames with the onset of 
the crisis. The industry and market environment related themes feature prominently, with 
roughly 20% of the reports containing narrative focusing on industry-associated keywords, 
and the pattern is time invariant, giving rise to insignificant t-test results.  
   During the pre-crisis period, analysts employed growth-related narrative with greater 
frequency, though the onset of the crisis appeared to curtail reference to growth-related 
activities with a statistically significant decline of more than 5 percentage points. Following 
the crisis, there is an insignificant 1.39 percentage point increase in word frequency score. 
The significant difference between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods suggests a persistent 
reduction in growth narrative following the crisis. A similar trend to that for growth is 
observed for the management and strategy theme. The significant decline with the onset of 
the crisis implies a greater focus on external factors, thereby decreasing the weight of firm-
specific, internal factors such as management and strategy and this effect is persistent 
following the crisis. 
   Analysts have traditionally focused on the financial performance of companies given 
investor preoccupation with the “bottom line”, and our results bear this out with discussion of 
financial performance constituting around 36% of the narrative. In contrast, analysts are 
considerably less interested in financial position, with only around 4% of the reports 
discussing financial position. In general, results for financial accounting factors do not 
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change markedly across the periods, excepting the comparison of the pre- and post-crisis 
periods for financial position. 
   Table 7 reports net sentiment score ((𝑃𝑃 − 𝑁𝑁)/𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 in Equation 2) by theme for the two 
word dictionaries.  The net sentiment scores from the LM dictionary are less than the Harvard 
dictionary scores, evidencing a general tendency of the LM dictionary to pick up more 
negative keywords compared to the Harvard dictionary. Both dictionary results reveal that all 
of the scores decline during the crisis period, and then revert back to almost pre-crisis scores 
thereafter. Indeed, the difference between pre-crisis and post-crisis period net sentiment is 
insignificant in each theme, whilst the difference between pre-crisis and crisis (and between 
crisis and post-crisis) net sentiment is significant for all themes except for the growth theme 
and the management and strategy theme. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
   Panel A shows that the analysts maintain a negative sentiment on the macroeconomic 
environment over the three sample periods, and that they focus on this theme more when the 
outlook is negative, though the standard deviation points to an increased and persistent spread 
of scores with the onset of the crisis. The sentiment for the industry and market environment 
theme shown in Panel B is positive in the pre-crisis period, falling to neutral (negative in the 
LM dictionary) during the crisis and reverting to the pre-crisis level once the crisis dynamics 
worked through. Panel C shows that sentiment concerning growth is positive throughout, 
reflecting the effects of the crisis through decline and subsequent recovery, though the 
difference across time is insignificant. Similarly, the sentiment shown in Panel D evidences a 
positive assessment of company management and strategy through time, a result consistent 
with Breton and Taffler (2001) who find that negative narrative here is rare and is in general 
offset by more positive narrative elsewhere. However, using the LM dictionary we observe 
negative net sentiment throughout, in sharp contrast to the Breton and Taffler results. 
Sentiment concerning financial performance, shown in Panel E, is positive throughout, 
though deteriorates markedly during the crisis (turning to negative in the LM dictionary), 
consistent with poor company performance during this time. Finally, financial position shown 
in Panel F deteriorates to become negative during the crisis, perhaps reflecting wider 
concerns about solvency or liquidity, to return to a positive sentiment in the post-crisis 
period. 
[Insert Table 8 and 9 here] 
   Table 8 and Table 9 present Pearson and Spearman correlations for the model variables 
using the LM and Harvard-IV-4 dictionaries, respectively. The correlation coefficients from 
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both dictionaries are in general very close, with the Harvard-IV-4 dictionary generating 
slightly higher correlation coefficients for most of the net sentiment scores. As expected, 
target premia and recommendations are strongly correlated. Target premium is positively 
correlated with financial position. The recommendation level is also positively correlated 
with both of the financial statement sentiment variables, with the addition of growth and the 
industry and market environment sentiment. All of our net sentiment variables exhibit 
significant positive correlation coefficients, suggesting that the general tone of analyst reports 
is consistent. In particular, financial performance is highly correlated with the other 
independent variables as might be expected, with the industry and market environment 
correlation coefficient the highest at 0.563. To check for possible multicollinearity issues we 
calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) and find that they are all below 2, suggesting that 
there is no risk of problematic multicollinearity in our regressions7. 
 
 4.2 Multivariate results 
   Table 10 presents the results of the recommendation model (Model 1) using the two 
dictionaries. We discuss the model results across the specifications by variable, focusing on 
themed sentiments and associated interaction effects. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
   The LM dictionary captures only a weak positive association between financial 
performance (SFinPerf) and stock recommendations (column 1), though the specification 
employing the Harvard dictionary (column 3) shows that sentiment related to financial 
position (SFinPos) and performance (SFinPerf) is positively associated with stock 
recommendations in the base model. Thus, more positive analyst sentiment in relation to 
financial statement items leads to a greater probability of a better recommendation. The 
period dummies are not significant, showing that while we observe some recommendation 
change over the three time periods, the period effects alone are not significant in a 
multivariate setting. We also find that the control variable, debt to equity (DebtEquity), 
exhibits a negative impact, indicating that high leverage and thus increased financial risk 
leads to a lower recommendation. We did not see a similar impact for the other control 
variables so we have excluded them from the table for brevity purposes. 
   When the interaction terms are included in the model (columns 2 and 4), the results provide 
a more interesting story. With regard to the external environment, we find that while the 
7 The highest VIF is for SFinPerf with a value of 1.96. 
22 
 
                                                 
industry and market environment (SIndEnv) fails to explain the recommendations, sentiment 
related to the macroeconomic and regulatory environment (SMacro) has an important 
relationship with stock recommendations for both dictionary types. During the benchmark 
pre-crisis period, SMacro is negatively related to the recommendation, suggesting that when 
sentiment in relation to this theme is negative (positive) analysts are on average more likely 
to give higher (lower) recommendations. The negative coefficient of SMacro is contrary to 
theory expectations, though this may be attributed to the dynamics of stock price reaction to 
the general macroeconomic environment in addition to how analysts modify their 
recommendations. When the general macroeconomic outlook is positive then this aggregate 
sentiment is reflected in higher stock prices, leaving little upside potential for an individual 
stock, though when general macroeconomic sentiment is negative then analysts promote an 
opportunity to buy the stocks at a ‘bargain’ price due to more significant upside potential. A 
further explanation can be found in analysts’ behaviour. We find from our univariate results 
in Table 7 that even before the crisis, analysts’ sentiment on the macroeconomic environment 
was on average negative. Analysts may employ the macroeconomic environment as a caveat 
device to couch their recommendations such that if their advice subsequently turns out to be 
poor then they can point to their external risk (conservative) narrative to maintain their 
credibility. The findings of Brown et al. (2014) and Hugon and Muslu (2010) that document 
conservatism in forecasts may also be applied to narrative balance rather than outputs as a 
mechanism to maintain credibility. This defensive strategy is also politically more sensible 
for the analyst as they balance their overall argument with reference to external factors rather 
than by criticising company management.  
   With the onset of the crisis we see an incremental association for SMacro with the 
coefficient changing to positive. This shows that analysts’ narrative about the macroeconomic 
and regulatory environment changed significantly during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis 
period. The positive coefficient for SMacro with the onset of the crisis evidences some 
behavioural correction as the severe (real) impact of the crisis on companies becomes a 
material risk factor which impacts upon stock prices and analysts’ recommendations. 
However, during the post-crisis period, the insignificant interaction coefficient shows that 
analyst sentiment is not significantly different from the pre-crisis period implying that 
analysts revert back to their pre-crisis position with regard to the relation between SMacro 
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and the recommendations they give. We employ the Wald test for the sum of the coefficients8 
to examine whether SMacro is significantly associated with stock recommendations during 
the crisis and post-crisis periods. The Wald statistic suggests that only the post-crisis period is 
significant for the LM dictionary. Thus we can infer that during the crisis period the 
association between SMacro and stock recommendations disappears, while during the post-
crisis period the negative association between SMacro and stock recommendations observed 
before the crisis re-emerges. 
   As in Breton and Taffler (2001) we employ growth to capture expansion in the operating 
capacity of the business, including actions such as acquisitions and capital expenditure. Thus, 
analysts normally mention firm growth in a positive sense, as such actions are more likely to 
improve their stock recommendations. Consistent with this expectation, the LM dictionary 
captures growth related sentiment (SGrowth) in the base (pre-crisis) period with a positive 
sign though with low significance. However, the Harvard dictionary fails to capture this 
effect. We see a reversal in the sign of growth sentiment to negative in the LM dictionary 
during the crisis, again with low significance, which persists and strengthens for both 
dictionaries following the crisis. The negative sign for the crisis and post-crisis periods 
indicates an incremental, period-contingent change in association between stock 
recommendations and growth. The Wald statistic for the sum of the coefficients is 
insignificant for both crisis and post-crisis periods, showing that while commentary on 
growth might be positively associated with stock recommendations during the pre-crisis 
(normal growth) period, the onset of the crisis and its aftermath leads to the disappearance of 
this effect. This may be attributed to analyst behavioural change with regard to attitude 
towards growth-related risk.  
   The model using the LM dictionary exhibits a significant negative coefficient for the 
management and strategy (SManStr) related sentiment during the crisis. This result shows 
that there is an incremental change with regard to this sentiment during the crisis compared to 
the pre-crisis period. For the LM dictionary, the Wald test for the crisis period suggests that 
there is a significant and net negative association between SManStr and stock 
recommendations. This might be due to analysts again trying to balance their arguments by 
providing relatively more positive (or less negative) commentary about management during 
8 We compute the Wald statistic to test whether the sum of the base (pre-crisis) period and crisis interaction 
coefficients is significant for the crisis period, and whether the sum of the base (pre-crisis) period and post-crisis 
interaction coefficients is significant for the post-crisis period. The null hypothesis is that the sum of the 
coefficients is equal to zero. 
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the crisis to maintain their lines of communication with company managers, despite their 
more unfavourable recommendations. 
   The financial statement related sentiment variables indicate that in the post-crisis period 
analyst sentiment on the financial fundamentals has more impact when they arrive at their 
recommendations. The model employing the Harvard dictionary captures a weak positive 
sign for both financial position (SFinPos) and financial performance (SFinPerf), whereas the 
LM dictionary captures only a strong positive sign for SFinPerf. The Wald test indicates that 
there is a significant net positive association between these two sentiment variables and stock 
recommendations in the post-crisis period. This ‘back to basics’ behaviour is consistent with 
analysts again focusing on linking recommendations to fundamental variables as the latter 
provide the best indication of a company’s future cash flows and underlying risk following 
the crisis. 
   In terms of period dummies, we do not find a significant impact of the periods on the 
recommendations as the interaction effects instead allow for theme-specific period effects. In 
terms of the control variables, only DebtEquity exhibits an association with 
recommendations, showing that more highly levered companies receive a less favourable 
recommendation. 
   Table 11 shows the association between themed sentiments and target price premia (Model 
2). In the specifications in columns 1 and 4, we examine the base specification and find that 
SMacro is negatively associated with the target premium whereas SFinPos has a positive 
sign. The period coefficients are significant and positive, showing that during the crisis and 
post-crisis periods target premia significantly increase, consistent with the descriptive 
statistics.  
   When we control for stock recommendation in the model in columns 2 and 5, we find that, 
as expected, the explanatory power of the model increases significantly and the 
recommendation variable is significant and positive, indicating that target price premia to a 
great extent map on to the recommendation structure. For both dictionaries we still find that 
both SMacro and SFinPos retain their explanatory power, suggesting that less (more) positive 
sentiment concerning the macroeconomic environment results in a higher (lower) target price 
premium, and more (less) positive sentiment concerning the financial position results in a 
higher (lower) target price premium, after controlling for the recommendation category in 
both cases.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
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   When the period and interaction effects are included (columns 3 and 6), we find similar 
results to those discussed for the recommendations model (Model 1). However, we observe 
stronger significance levels for both dictionaries in our models and the Wald tests. The only 
exception is management and strategy sentiment (SManStr) for which the Wald statistic was 
significant during the crisis in the recommendations model but not in the target price premia 
model. We find that target price premia during the crisis enjoy a positive step jump from pre-
crisis levels, evidencing a widening differential between market (investor) prices and 
analysts’ valuations. In the Harvard dictionary, this incremental impact is persistent in the 
post-crisis period with a weak positive coefficient. The Wald tests show that, consistent with 
the pre-crisis period, during the post-crisis period SMacro is also a significant negative driver 
of target premia, and that financial statement sentiment fundamentals are positively 
associated with target premia, consistent with the recommendations models. Consistent with 
our recommendations model, DebtEquity is also a negative driver of target price premia.  
   Across the two models, we can observe that the crisis leads to a disconnection between 
narrative sentiment and the analyst outputs of stock recommendations and target price 
premia. The impact of sentiment themes is therefore period-contingent as their precise impact 
in terms of both magnitude and direction varies across the sample periods. While before the 
crisis a combination of negative (positive) macroeconomic environment and a positive 
(negative) growth sentiment results in higher (lower) stock recommendations, the crisis 
partially reverses and thus leads to the disappearance of such relationships. During the post-
crisis period we observe that SMacro re-emerges as an important factor, together with 
financial statement sentiments, especially SFinPerf.  
  In summary, we find a negative sign for SMacro for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods 
alone in both the recommendations and target premia models, which do not provide support 
for H1. For SGrowth, the pre-crisis period provides some support for H2, though no support 
thereafter. For SManStr, our results do not provide support for H3. With regard to SFinPos 
and SFinPerf, we find support for H4, though only following the crisis period. 
   In general we find significant deterioration of association between the themed sentiments 
and the analyst report outputs during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods. The only exception to this is management and strategy related sentiment 
(SManStr) for the recommendation model with the LM dictionary. These results provide 
support for our overarching hypothesis H5. Thus, the Global Financial Crisis does indeed 
impact upon analysts’ behaviour and we observe a disconnect between analysts’ sentiment 
and the outputs they produce during this period.  
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5. Additional analyses and robustness tests 
5.1 Themed sentiments and deviation from consensus estimates 
   In further analyses, we also model analyst deviation from both consensus target price 
premia and recommendations. We expect that analysts will more clearly justify and thus 
strengthen their arguments as they deviate from consensus outputs. To measure deviation 
from consensus target premia (DevTP) we take the difference between analysts’ consensus 
target prices and the target price in an individual analyst’s report, and then scale it by the 
market price. To measure deviation from consensus recommendation (DevRec), we take the 
difference between the consensus recommendation and the analyst’s recommendation.  
   The recommendations deviation model presented in Table 12 shows qualitatively similar 
results to those observed earlier for Model 1, suggesting that the drivers of stock 
recommendations remain similar as analysts deviate from the consensus recommendation. 
However, the Wald test reveals that during the crisis the sentiment for SMacro is positively 
associated and during the post-crisis period SMacro is not associated with the deviation from 
consensus recommendation. The target premia deviation model presented in Table 13 is also 
qualitatively similar to Model 2. The exception is that the crisis and post-crisis period 
dummies are not significant, indicating that the deviation from consensus target prices does 
not on average vary markedly over the study periods. Furthermore, contrary to the earlier 
model, we find no impact of the macroeconomic and regulatory environment sentiment 
(SMacro) on target premia deviations. Thus, while sentiment in relation to this theme can 
explain target price premia, we do not find evidence of it impacting upon the analyst versus 
consensus target premium differential. 
[Insert Tables 12 and 13 here] 
 
5.2 Separating positive and negative sentiment scores 
   In the finance literature there is broad agreement on the asymmetric impact of positive and 
negative news, whereby negative news generates more market reaction than positive news. 
Tetlock et al. (2008) find a similar result when examining the impact of the negative tone in 
financial news on stock prices. Breton and Taffler (2001) compute sentiment scores which 
are not aggregated in order to measure the impact of positive, neutral or negative tone on 
stock recommendations. As a robustness check, we therefore treat positive and negative 
sentiment scores separately to analyse the association with stock recommendations and target 
premia. Table 14 presents the models estimated for negative sentiment only as positive 
27 
 
sentiment models fail to capture the impact of individual sentiment scores on either target 
premia or recommendations. 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
   For the recommendations models, employing only negative sentiment generates less 
significant model variables compared to using net sentiment scores. In particular, for the 
benchmark pre-crisis period none of the variables are significant. This might be due to the 
lack of usage of negative words in the analyst reports during the bull period. However, we 
find a negative sign for NegSMacro during the crisis, and a significant Wald test result, 
suggesting that the more (less) negative the tone of analysts’ narrative in relation to 
macroeconomic factors, the more likely it is that they issue a lower (higher) recommendation. 
For the post-crisis period the Wald test confirms that negative tone concerning the industry 
and market environment (NegSIndEnv) is positively associated with stock recommendations, 
implying that the more frequently that analysts use negative words on this theme the more 
likely they are to give a higher recommendation. As this theme is related to the external firm 
environment, the explanation above for the macroeconomic environment may also apply to 
this theme. Finally, we also observe that negative financial performance sentiment 
(NegSFinPerf) has a negative sign, implying that negative tone is associated with lower stock 
recommendations, a result confirmed by the Wald test.  
   In the target premia model, during the pre-crisis benchmark period we find that NegSMacro 
and NegSGrowth are significant with signs consistent with those in model 2. The Harvard 
dictionary also yields a negative sign for NegSIndEnv which is consistent with theoretical 
expectations. As observed in the recommendations model, during the crisis NegSMacro is 
significant and negative, indicating a reversal of the relationship. However, the Wald statistic 
for the sum of the two coefficients is insignificant and thus the overall effect during the crisis 
is offset. The results for the post-crisis period in the target premia model are similar to those 
in the recommendations model. 
  In summary, while in general we observe consistent results from the negative sentiment 
models, it is net sentiment which generates more robust results when attempting to explain 
both recommendations and target price premia. 
 
5.3 Other specifications and data transformations 
   As a robustness check to determine whether our results vary by industry categories, we add 
dummies to account for (i) cyclical versus defensive industries and (ii) new versus old 
economy industries. Our results, not tabulated here, show that these added variables are not 
28 
 
significant and their addition does not impact on our results. Further, instead of using the 
absolute values of sentiment scores in our models, we rank them and employ the rank scores 
as model variables. Although we do not present the models here, the results are qualitatively 
similar to the findings for models 1 and 2, with the exception that financial performance 
sentiment during the post-crisis period is no longer significant. Finally, as in Tetlock et al. 
(2008), we compute a standardised measurement score for sentiment variables but find (in 
results not reported here) that it makes no significant impact on our findings.  
 
6. Conclusion 
   In this paper we examine the relationship between themed sentiment in analyst report 
narratives and the outputs generated by the analysts, namely recommendations and target 
price premia. We also determine whether that relationship changes, or more specifically 
diminishes, with the onset of the crisis. Prior research on analysts’ reports focuses on the 
impact of their outputs on stock prices and shows that not only the outputs but also the 
narrative has incremental information content. However there is little research on whether 
analyst narrative is related or indeed consistent with the outputs. Our paper addresses this 
shortcoming and provides evidence on how the relationship changes in response to the crisis. 
   Our results reveal that themed sentiment has an association with analysts’ outputs which is 
far from stable over a period when economic conditions are volatile. Analysts respond to 
these changing conditions by changing the outputs, though the change in the sentiments is not 
proportional and indeed can reveal both changes in magnitude and direction. More precisely, 
we observe that the Global Financial Crisis leads to a diminution of the relationship between 
narrative sentiment and both stock recommendations and target price premia, thereby 
confirming that the impact of sentiment themes is period-contingent. Although not tested in 
this paper, this dynamic might be explained in terms of analysts’ bias as they try to balance 
their arguments by softening unfavourable recommendations/premia or employing certain 
themes as a (negative) caveat device to qualify favourable outputs. The results might be 
explained by analysts’ optimism with regard to outputs and an under-reaction to negative 
news. 
   A broad finding of our study is that the external environment diminishes in its effect on 
analysts’ outputs with the onset of the crisis, only to be restored thereafter. It is possible that 
during the crisis period, the uncertainty analysts faced leads to a refocus of attention away 
from less direct towards more direct drivers of recommendations and stock price premia. 
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Following the crisis there is evidently a new ‘back to basics’ focus whereby financial 
fundamentals are placed at the heart of their analysis, with analysts focusing on financial 
position and performance. This latter result reinforces the importance of accounting numbers 
to market agents as they are coerced to rediscover more direct fundamental valuation models 
following a volatile shock. 
   A further contribution of our study is to document that the relation between the themed 
sentiment and analysts’ report outputs is not stationary and it is contingent upon changing 
market conditions. Our results are relevant to both practitioners and researchers who are 
interested in the information search and evaluation behaviour of analysts. 
   Our research has a number of limitations. First, although we endeavour to control for errors 
in the coding process, our sentiment data may not fully capture actual sentiment in the reports 
due to limitations in the application of pre-determined dictionaries. We identify and manually 
validate our themes and theme dictionary, but it is possible that a more granular theme 
categorisation may provide some further insights into the behaviour of analysts. We select a 
balanced sample of 275 reports from the largest firms in each respective industry, though we 
recognise that this approach may impact upon the generalizability of our results. Future 
research in this area may investigate how analyst biases and characteristics affect the 
relationship between sentiment and output as we believe analysts may try to hedge their 
recommendations with their narrative argument. 
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Table 1. Distribution of sample companies across industries 
 
Industry Code (ICB3)  Number of  Companies Distribution (%) 
   
Industrial Goods and Services  13 22.81% 
Oil & Gas  6 10.53% 
Travel and Leisure  6 10.53% 
Basic Resources  5 8.77% 
Retail  5 8.77% 
Technology  4 7.02% 
Food and Beverage  3 5.26% 
Media  3 5.26% 
Personal and Household Goods  3 5.26% 
Chemicals  2 3.51% 
Healthcare  2 3.51% 
Telecommunication  2 3.51% 
Utilities  2 3.51% 
Construction and Materials  1 1.75% 
Total 57 100.00% 
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Table 2. Distribution of sample reports across brokerage houses 
 
Brokerage house 
Number of 
reports 
Distribution 
(%) 
Number of 
companies 
Ratio of 
reports per 
company 
Morgan Stanley 56 20.36% 33 1.70 
Deutsche Bank 49 17.82% 32 1.53 
JPMorgan 39 14.18% 26 1.50 
Credit Suisse 28 10.18% 21 1.33 
RBS 15 5.45% 12 1.25 
HSBC 13 4.73% 13 1.00 
Evolution 12 4.36% 12 1.00 
Investec 11 4.00% 8 1.38 
Panmure Gordon 10 3.64% 9 1.11 
ABN Amro 9 3.27% 8 1.13 
Bernstein 6 2.18% 6 1.00 
Societe Generale 6 2.18% 6 1.00 
ING 4 1.45% 4 1.00 
Numis 4 1.45% 4 1.00 
Canaccord 2 0.73% 1 2.00 
Uni Credit 2 0.73% 2 1.00 
Arbuthnot 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Collins Steward 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Jefferies 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Landsbanki 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Macquaire 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Raiffeisen 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Seymour Pierce 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
West LB 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Williams de Broë 1 0.36% 1 1.00 
Total 275 100.00%   
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Table 3. Recommendations, recommendation changes and target price changes over the 
sample period 
 
Outcome Pre-
crisis 
% Crisis % Post-
crisis 
% Total % 
 
Panel A: Recommendations 
         
Buy 44 56.41% 47 50.54% 70 67.31% 161 58.55% 
Hold 26 33.33% 33 35.48% 27 25.96% 86 31.27% 
Sell 8 10.26% 13 13.98% 7 6.73% 28 10.18% 
Total 78 100.00% 93 100.00% 104 100.00% 275 100.00% 
         
Panel B: Change in recommendation 
         
Up 17 21.79% 9 9.68% 18 17.31% 44 16.00% 
Reiterate 54 69.23% 71 76.34% 80 76.92% 205 74.55% 
Down 7 8.97% 13 13.98% 6 5.77% 26 9.45% 
Total 78 100.00% 93 100.00% 104 100.00% 275 100.00% 
         
Panel C: Change in target price 
         
Up 51 68.92% 35 38.89% 72 69.90% 158 59.18% 
Reiterate 14 18.92% 24 26.67% 18 17.48% 56 20.97% 
Down 9 12.16% 31 34.44% 13 12.62% 53 19.85% 
Total 74 100.00% 90 100.00% 103 100.00% 267 100.00% 
         
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the target price premium 
 
Target Price Premium        
 Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max t-stata 
Pre-crisis 0.092 0.121 -0.250 0.023 0.108 0.164 0.419 -2.738*** 
Crisis 0.155 0.178 -0.455 0.069 0.142 0.238 0.697 -0.882 
Post-crisis 0.162 0.179 -0.293 0.053 0.154 0.227 0.833 -3.182*** 
Notes: a :The first t-statistic of each panel is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and the crisis reports, the second t-statistic is 
calculated to compare crisis reports and post-crisis reports, and the third t-statistic is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and post-crisis 
reports. 
 
***, **, *: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Themes and example keywords and phrases employed in the thematic dictionary 
 
 
Macroeconomic and regulatory environment (184 keywords): budget deficit, economic 
environment, exchange rate, fiscal policy, government spending, macro environment, 
quantitative easing, unemployment 
  
Industry and market environment (94 keywords): bargaining power, competition, contracts, 
customers, industry, market share, market condition, substitute products 
 
Growth (80 keywords): acquisition, alliance, capacity expansion, investment programme, 
merger, new project, organic growth, takeover 
 
Management and strategy (79 keywords): appointment, business model, CEO, core 
competence, corporate strategy, differentiation, management team, reorganisation 
 
Financial performance (95 keywords): contribution, EBIT, Profit, finance charge, like for 
like, margin, SG&A, turnover 
 
Financial position (89 keywords): collection period, current ratio, credit facility, debenture, 
financial distress, gearing, pension scheme, working capital 
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Table 6. The major themes employed in the reports 
 
 Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max t-stata 
Panel A: Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environment 
Pre-crisis 7.17% 6.67% 0.00% 2.42% 5.38% 10.41% 32.14% -4.082*** 
Crisis 11.74% 7.99% 0.85% 4.89% 10.67% 16.50% 42.40% 0.808 
Post-crisis 10.88% 6.79% 0.00% 6.64% 9.72% 14.50% 40.34% -3.694*** 
Panel B: Industry and Market Environment 
Pre-crisis 20.73% 9.81% 1.01% 14.07% 18.70% 26.26% 55.17% 1.047 
Crisis 19.24% 8.55% 0.00% 12.57% 19.19% 24.53% 42.66% -0.382 
Post-crisis 19.73% 9.27% 3.59% 13.38% 17.85% 26.68% 43.70% 0.698 
Panel C: Growth 
Pre-crisis 13.75% 11.58% 0.00% 5.35% 11.28% 18.96% 59.48% 3.632*** 
Crisis 8.24% 7.37% 0.00% 3.44% 6.76% 11.12% 41.31% -1.214 
Post-crisis 9.63% 8.70% 0.00% 3.83% 7.38% 13.42% 51.87% 2.634*** 
Panel D: Management and Strategy 
Pre-crisis 5.54% 4.64% 0.00% 2.16% 4.40% 7.77% 19.97% 2.604** 
Crisis 3.83% 3.78% 0.00% 1.43% 2.68% 4.77% 19.38% -0.228 
Post-crisis 3.95% 3.40% 0.00% 1.21% 3.03% 6.04% 13.79% 2.556** 
Panel E: Financial Performance 
Pre-crisis 35.86% 14.46% 5.07% 25.35% 35.70% 48.15% 65.38% 0.027 
Crisis 35.81% 13.21% 7.14% 26.64% 35.38% 44.91% 71.84% -0.476 
Post-crisis 36.88% 15.43% 4.16% 25.23% 37.16% 48.01% 79.47% -0.410 
Panel F: Financial Position 
Pre-crisis 3.40% 3.32% 0.00% 0.76% 3.10% 4.66% 15.68% -0.613 
Crisis 3.79% 4.90% 0.00% 0.45% 2.24% 4.86% 21.52% -0.554 
Post-crisis 4.13% 3.58% 0.00% 1.54% 3.52% 5.52% 20.76% -1.417 
Notes: a :The first t-statistic of each panel is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and the crisis reports, the second t-statistic is 
calculated to compare crisis reports and post-crisis reports, and the third t-statistic is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and post-crisis 
reports. 
 
***, **, *: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Analyst sentiment by theme 
 
LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
 Mean StDev Median t-stata Mean StDev Median t-stata 
Panel A: Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environment 
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆)  
Pre-crisis -0.04% 0.14% -0.02% 4.333*** -0.02% 0.16% -0.01% 3.183*** 
Crisis -0.18% 0.28% -0.14% -2.372** -0.13% 0.29% -0.08% -2.229** 
Post-crisis -0.08% 0.31% -0.04% 1.216 -0.04% 0.32% 0.00% 0.421 
Panel B: Industry and Market Environment (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)  
Pre-crisis 0.07% 0.37% 0.03% 2.237** 0.14% 0.38% 0.12% 2.504*** 
Crisis -0.04% 0.31% -0.01% -3.002*** 0.01% 0.32% 0.01% -3.203*** 
Post-crisis 0.09% 0.30% 0.06% -0.264 0.15% 0.32% 0.13% -0.185 
Panel C: Growth (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ)  
Pre-crisis 0.03% 0.19% 0.02% 0.902 0.08% 0.22% 0.06% 1.482 
Crisis 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% -1.181 0.02% 0.26% 0.03% -1.067 
Post-crisis 0.04% 0.22% 0.02% 0.312 0.06% 0.26% 0.03% 0.406 
Panel D: Management and Strategy (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉)  
Pre-crisis -0.06% 0.20% 0.00% -1.506 0.05% 0.13% 0.02% 0.979 
Crisis -0.02% 0.13% 0.00% 0.021 0.03% 0.11% 0.00% -1.038 
Post-crisis -0.02% 0.15% 0.00% -1.501 0.05% 0.11% 0.03% 0.134 
Panel E: Financial Performance (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆)  
Pre-crisis 0.23% 0.52% 0.13% 3.076*** 0.30% 0.58% 0.19% 2.399** 
Crisis -0.03% 0.55% -0.05% -2.410** 0.09% 0.58% 0.07% -2.289** 
Post-crisis 0.15% 0.44% 0.12% 1.111 0.26% 0.49% 0.27% 0.445 
Panel F: Financial Position (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)  
Pre-crisis 0.02% 0.12% 0.00% 2.685*** 0.03% 0.13% 0.00% 2.201** 
Crisis -0.03% 0.15% 0.00% -3.294*** -0.02% 0.15% 0.00% -3.091*** 
Post-crisis 0.03% 0.12% 0.00% -0.476 0.04% 0.12% 0.01% -0.689 
Notes: a :The first t-statistic of each panel is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and the crisis reports, the second t-statistic is 
calculated to compare crisis reports and post-crisis reports and the third t-statistic is calculated to compare pre-crisis reports and 
post-crisis reports. 
 
***, **, *: Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Correlations (Pearson below diagonal and Spearman above diagonal) for LM dictionary 
 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  0.741*** 0.104* 0.031 -0.083 0.122** 0.169*** 0.095 0.029 -0.076 -0.050 -0.067 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0.670***  0.248*** 0.086 0.067 0.199*** 0.185*** 0.226*** 0.032 0.082 0.741*** -0.014 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 0.057 0.226***  0.252*** 0.274*** 0.317*** 0.285*** 0.551*** -0.141** 0.196** 0.104* 0.008 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 0.010 0.079 0.203***  0.029 0.255*** 0.044 0.251*** -0.017 0.063 -0.062 0.026 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -0.103* 0.085 0.256*** 0.131**  0.224*** 0.174*** 0.383*** 0.047 0.317*** -0.083 0.0180*** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 0.007 0.139** 0.324*** 0.235*** 0.209***  0.237*** 0.378*** -0.022 0.153** 0.122** 0.041 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 0.196*** 0.203*** 0.302*** 0.106* 0.173*** 0.203***  0.386*** 0.009 0.117* 0.056 0.104* 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 0.071 0.252*** 0.563*** 0.241*** 0.392*** 0.385*** 0.345***  -0.060 0.252*** -0.16*** 0.073 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 0.045 0.029 -0.081 0.018 0.101* -0.024 0.026 -0.006  0.130*** -0.005 0.176** 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 -0.017 0.030 0.038 0.026 0.072 0.009 0.011 -0.015 0.005  0.217*** 0.671*** 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 -0.064 -0.127** -0.066 0.008 -0.242*** -0.008 0.041 -0.203*** -0.074 -0.013  0.274*** 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 -0.011 -0.021 -0.057 0.036 -0.035 -0.003 0.020 -0.069 0.055 0.667*** 0.063  
This Table presents the correlation coefficients for the model variables. Pearson correlations are presented in the lower diagonal and Spearman correlations are presented in the upper diagonal. TPrem is a continuous variable and is calculated 
as the difference between the target price and the current market price scaled by the current market price. Rec is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell recommendation. Analysts’ themed sentiment 
scores are labelled in brackets as follows: industry and market environment (SIndEnv), management and strategy (SManStr), macroeconomic and regulatory environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth),  financial position (SFinPos), and 
financial performance (SFinPerf). The natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), the price to book ratio (PB), the return on common equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio (DebtEquity) are firm-level level control 
variables.***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Correlations (Pearson below diagonal and Spearman above diagonal) for Harvard-IV-4 dictionary 
 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  0.741*** 0.089 -0.012 -0.049 0.135** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.029 -0.076 -0.050 -0.067 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0.670***  0.223*** 0.081 0.079 0.199*** 0.179*** 0.271*** 0.032 0.082 0.741*** -0.014 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 0.033 0.209***  0.272*** 0.266*** 0.392*** 0.299*** 0.587*** -0.141** 0.196** 0.104* 0.008 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 -0.038 0.064 0.258***  0.086 0.255*** 0.010* 0.281*** -0.017 0.063 -0.062 0.026 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -0.097 0.087 0.238*** 0.162***  0.261*** 0.121** 0.384*** 0.047 0.317*** -0.083 0.0180*** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 0.036 0.132** 0.359*** 0.321*** 0.256***  0.272*** 0.461*** -0.022 0.153** 0.122** 0.041 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 0.208*** 0.220*** 0.281*** 0.150** 0.099 0.222***  0.394*** 0.009 0.117* 0.056 0.104* 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 0.103* 0.262*** 0.607*** 0.282*** 0.401*** 0.435*** 0.310***  -0.060 0.252*** -0.16*** 0.073 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿 0.045 0.029 -0.081 0.018 0.101* -0.024 0.026 -0.006  0.130*** -0.005 0.176** 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 -0.017 0.030 0.038 0.026 0.072 0.009 0.011 -0.015 0.005  0.217*** 0.671*** 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 -0.064 -0.127** -0.066 0.008 -0.242*** -0.008 0.041 -0.203*** -0.074 -0.013  0.274*** 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 -0.011 -0.021 -0.057 0.036 -0.035 -0.003 0.020 -0.069 0.055 0.667*** 0.063  
This Table presents the correlation coefficients for the model variables. Pearson correlations are presented in the lower diagonal and Spearman correlations are presented in the upper diagonal. TPrem is a continuous variable and is calculated 
as the difference between the target price and the current market price scaled by the current market price. Rec is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell recommendation. Analysts’ themed sentiment 
scores are labelled in brackets as follows: industry and market environment (SIndEnv), management and strategy (SManStr), macroeconomic and regulatory environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth),  financial position (SFinPos), and 
financial performance (SFinPerf). The natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), the price to book ratio (PB), the return on common equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio (DebtEquity) are firm-level level control 
variables.***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Impact of themed sentiments on stock recommendations  
 
 LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 59.847 159.578  24.075 133.340 
 (1.24) (1.63)  (0.55) (1.07) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 10.662 35.728  -5.275 -32.415 
 (0.13) (0.36)  (-0.05) (-0.18) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -48.860 -311.426  -46.050 -319.774 
 (-0.87) (-2.02)**  (-0.84) (-2.24)** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 14.029 284.715  -3.307 190.975 
 (0.23) (1.76)*  (-0.06) (1.37) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 140.636 -56.518  225.945 42.032 
 (1.12) (-0.34)  (1.93)* (0.19) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 61.749 -68.061  71.491 -1.244 
 (1.66)* (-1.11)  (2.11)** (0.02) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.053 0.172  0.0575 0.351 
 (0.15) (0.44)  (0.17) (0.92) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.473 0.221  0.461 0.447 
 (1.31) (0.52)  (1.26) (0.90) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  -59.373   -83.814 
  (-0.46)   (-0.59) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉  -395.672   44.785 
  (-2.07)**   (0.15) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  437.412   429.475 
  (2.47)**   (2.41)** 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ  -271.987   -159.808 
  (-1.78)*   (-1.07) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  322.699   286.416 
  (1.65)   (1.18) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  115.932   23.267 
  (1.49)   (0.25) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  -158.757   -171.875 
  (-1.00)   (-1.02) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉  147.887   -123.482 
  (0.81)   (-0.47) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  116.017   173.133 
  (0.64)   (0.96) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ  -632.261   -354.922 
  (-2.10)**   (-2.01)** 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  320.624   499.418 
  (1.40)   (1.69)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  301.954   184.528 
  (3.16)***   (1.83)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷  -0.003 -0.002  -0.003 -0.003 
 (-2.61)*** (-1.65)*  (-2.81)*** (-2.22)** 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷. 0.057 0.115  0.062 0.099 
This Table measures the impact of themed sentiment on stock recommendations (Rec). Rec is an ordinal 
variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell recommendation. We employ an 
ordinal logistic regression for this model. The independent variables are analysts’ sentiment scores for the 
industry and market environment (SIndEnv), management and strategy (SManStr), the macroeconomic and 
regulatory environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth), financial position (SFinPos), and financial 
performance (SFinPerf). DCrisis and DPostCrisis are dummy variables which take a value of 1 when the 
report is written during the crisis (post crisis) period, and 0 otherwise. The reference category here is the 
pre-crisis period. The control variables are the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), the 
price to book ratio (PB), the return on common equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio (DebtEquity). For 
brevity, we only report significant control variables. The z-statistics are given in parentheses, and ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics are calculated 
using White robust standard errors and are clustered by company to control for dependency in error terms. 
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Table 11. Impact of themed sentiments on target price premia  
 
  LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 0.006 -0.199 0.028 0.009 -0.190 0.026 
 (0.08) (-3.45)*** (0.37) (0.13) (-3.34)*** (0.38) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 0.778 -2.531 3.575 -2.558 -4.277 3.140 
 (0.20) (-0.81) (0.90) (-0.82) (-1.67) (0.63) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 -3.124 -3.623 -1.806 -9.921 -7.732 -11.969 
 (-0.43) (-0.66) (-0.26) (-1.38) (-1.31) (-1.28) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -10.319 -7.736 -22.262 -10.474 -8.294 -21.824 
 (-1.75)* (-1.74)* (-2.58)** (-1.88)* (-1.97)* (-2.57)** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ -1.861 -3.639 17.114 1.460 0.496 17.408 
 (-0.21) (-0.50) (1.75)* (0.21) (0.09) (2.37)** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 27.165 17.274 7.601 28.778 15.389 6.787 
 (2.29)** (2.18)** (0.77) (2.41)** (1.77)* (0.84) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 2.535 -0.543 -2.464 4.188 0.821 -0.155 
 (0.75) (-0.21) (-0.77) (1.54) (0.38) (-0.06) 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  0.168   0.165  
  (13.06)***   (13.75)***  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.078 0.075 0.103 0.075 0.0732 0.0985 
 (3.42)*** (4.75)*** (3.77)*** (3.25)*** (4.81)*** (3.57)*** 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.068 0.044 0.045 0.068 0.044 0.0569 
 (3.11)*** (2.73)*** (1.61) (3.12)*** (2.88)*** (1.86)* 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   -0.427   -9.083 
   (-0.04)   (-0.99) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉   -6.257   11.538 
   (-0.47)   (0.75) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   27.672   26.509 
   (2.46)**   (2.28)** 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ   -18.107   -12.459 
   (-1.93)*   (-1.61) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   35.153   38.447 
   (1.52)   (1.60) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   0.637   1.033 
   (0.10)   (0.18) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   -4.826   -4.703 
   (-0.59)   (-0.53) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉   -5.773   -18.806 
   (-0.44)   (-0.93) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   2.0801   0.373 
   (0.19)   (0.04) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ   -31.306   -25.685 
   (-1.76)*   (-1.72)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   26.608   39.752 
   (1.33)   (1.98)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   13.687   10.052 
   (2.35)**   (1.93)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-3.19)*** (-1.31) (-1.78)* (-3.70)*** (-1.76)* (-1.96)* 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴.𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷. 0.111 0.523 0.182 0.126 0.522 0.204 
This Table measures the impact of themed sentiment on target price premia (TPrem). TPrem is a continuous variable and is calculated as the 
difference between the target price and the current market price scaled by the current market price. We estimate the target premium model by means 
of an OLS model. The independent variables are analysts’ sentiment scores for the industry environment (SIndEnv), management and strategy 
(SManStr), the macroeconomic environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth),  financial position (SFinPos), and financial performance (SFinPerf). Rec 
is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell recommendation.  DCrisis and DPostCrisis are dummy variables 
which take a value of 1 when the report is written during the crisis (post crisis) period and 0 otherwise. The reference category here is the pre-crisis 
period. The control variables are natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), price to book ratio (PB), return on common equity (ROE), 
and debt to equity (DebtEquity). For brevity, we only report the control variables that are significant. The t-statistics are given in parentheses, and 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using White’s robust standard errors 
and are clustered by companies to control for dependency in error terms. 
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Table 12. Impact of themed sentiments on deviation from consensus recommendations 
 LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 0.142 0.250  0.163 0.211 
 (0.60) (1.07)  (0.67) (0.86) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 15.173 37.947  5.860 41.733 
 (1.27) (1.52)  (0.48) (1.30) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 -9.031 -0.408  -4.701 -36.083 
 (-0.31) (-0.01)  (-0.15) (-0.74) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -0.120 -67.377  1.877 -81.266 
 (-0.01) (-2.02)**  (0.12) (-2.59)** 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ -3.206 85.960  -9.118 69.178 
 (-0.18) (1.93)*  (-0.49) (1.92)* 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 27.406 -21.541  55.131 16.951 
 (0.78) (-0.43)  (1.95)* (0.33) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 13.607 -16.731  13.571 -10.885 
 (1.50) (-1.30)  (1.53) (-0.71) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.036 0.076  0.027 0.123 
 (0.36) (0.72)  (0.27) (1.06) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.173 0.133  0.158 0.167 
 (1.63)* (1.07)  (1.56) (1.19) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  -24.797   -43.452 
  (-0.70)   (-1.11) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉  -121.963   27.380 
  (-2.23)**   (0.34) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  109.761   124.671 
  (2.71)***   (2.83)*** 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ  -105.113   -94.335 
  (-2.36)**   (-2.15)** 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  102.278   94.148 
  (1.48)   (1.50) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  31.298   17.548 
  (1.46)   (0.73) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  -34.640   -47.377 
  (-0.96)   (-1.13) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉  25.412   16.398 
  (0.41)   (0.22) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  50.133   66.850 
  (1.23)   (1.74)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ  -117.186   -106.009 
  (-2.54)**   (-2.46)** 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  27.606   38.140 
  (0.41)   (0.53) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆  58.111   44.943 
  (3.11)***   (2.17)** 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷  -0.006 -0.003  -0.007 -0.006 
 (-3.11)*** (-1.08)  (-3.38)*** (-1.99)** 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴.𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷. 0.070 0.152  0.075 0.131 
This Table measures the impact of themed sentiment on the deviation from consensus stock recommendations (DevRec). DevRec is a continuous 
variable and is the difference between consensus stock recommendations and an individual analyst’s stock recommendation on a three point scale. 
We estimate models by means of an OLS regression. The independent variables are analysts’ sentiment scores for the industry and market 
environment (SIndEnv), management and strategy (SManStr), the macroeconomic and regulatory environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth), financial 
position (SFinPos), and financial performance (SFinPerf). DCrisis and DPostCrisis are dummy variables which take a value of 1 when the report is 
written during the crisis (post crisis) period, and 0 otherwise. The reference category here is the pre-crisis period. The control variables are the natural 
logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), the price to book ratio (PB), the return on common equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio 
(DebtEquity). For brevity, we only report significant control variables. The t-statistics are given in parentheses, and ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics are calculated using White robust standard errors and are clustered by 
company to control for dependency in error terms. 
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Table 13. Impact of themed sentiments on deviation from consensus target price premia  
  LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 -0.137 -0.287 -0.099 -0.147 -0.293 -0.109 
 (-1.16) (-2.52)** (-0.84) (1.20) (-2.54)** (-0.89) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 2.776 0.362 7.492 0.572 -0.686 9.382 
 (0.80) (0.11) (1.33) (0.17) (-0.23) (1.38) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 -2.469 -2.833 -5.886 1.731 3.333 9.010 
 (-0.26) (-0.35) (-0.41) (0.13) (0.29) (0.71) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 2.309 4.194 18.015 1.027 2.622 3.405 
 (0.36) (0.72) (0.83) (0.17) (0.49) (0.22) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 6.525 5.228 33.423 5.194 4.488 22.082 
 (0.80) (0.75) (2.80)*** (0.69) (0.69) (1.73)* 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 19.447 12.231 2.271 23.744 12.948 11.222 
 (1.89)* (1.22) (0.14) (2.00)** (1.14) (0.73) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 2.117 -0.129 -6.172 2.977 0.514 -6.309 
 (0.59) (-0.04) (-0.95) (0.87) (0.16) (-1.06) 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  0.123   0.121  
  (6.51)***   (6.34)***  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.362 
 (0.87) (0.77) (0.83) (0.73) (0.66) (0.94) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.049 0.031 0.017 0.047 0.030 0.028 
 (1.48) (0.90) (0.41) (1.38) (0.86) (0.68) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   -3.820   -10.819 
   (-0.30)   (-0.84) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉   -8.229   -36.272 
   (-0.37)   (-1.37) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   -3.295   9.977 
   (-0.17)   (0.65) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ   -28.329   -17.556 
   (-2.43)**   (-1.34) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   19.583   9.539 
   (0.70)   (0.36) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   8.897   13.411 
   (1.21)   (1.82)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   -7.781   -12.890 
   (-1.00)   (-1.37) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉   6.666   3.154 
   (0.32)   (0.11) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   -27.449   -12.147 
   (-1.27)   (-0.73) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ   -41.039   -29.785 
   (-2.37)**   (-1.77)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆   36.723   34.421 
   (1.70)*   (1.67) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆   14.024   13.684 
   (1.95)*   (2.07)** 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷  -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-6.70)*** (-5.01)*** (-2.97)*** (-5.82)*** (-4.16)*** (-2.31)** 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 0.014 0.018 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.021 
 (1.35) (1.44) (2.25)** (1.37) (1.45) (2.58)** 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴.𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷. 0.106 0.270 0.163 0.112 0.270 0.168 
This Table measures the impact of themed sentiment on the deviation from consensus target price premia (DevTPrem). DevTPrem is a continuous 
variable and is calculated as the difference between consensus target price and an individual analyst’s target price, scaled by the market price. We 
estimate models by means of an OLS regression. The independent variables are analysts’ sentiment scores for the industry and market environment 
(SIndEnv), management and strategy (SManStr), the macroeconomic and regulatory environment (SMacro), growth (SGrowth), financial position 
(SFinPos), and financial performance (SFinPerf). Rec is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell 
recommendation. DCrisis and DPostCrisis are dummy variables which take a value of 1 when the report is written during the crisis (post crisis) period, 
and 0 otherwise. The reference category here is the pre-crisis period. The control variables are the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), 
the price to book ratio (PB), the return on common equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio (DebtEquity). For brevity, we only report significant control 
variables. The t-statistics are given in parentheses, and ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics 
are calculated using White robust standard errors, and are clustered by company to control for dependency in error terms. 
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Table 14. Impact of themed negative sentiments on target price premia and recommendations 
 LM Dictionary Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary 
Variables Rec TPrem  Rec TPrem 
𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒  0.071   0.075 
  (1.01)   (1.05) 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -16.057 -5.916  -106.331 -8.556 
 (-0.16) (-1.22)  (-1.00) (-1.74)* 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 51.193 -0.089  30.245 2.237 
 (0.51) (-0.02)  (0.18) (0.25) 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 273.780 21.225  237.893 20.186 
 (1.35) (2.15)**  (1.30) (2.19)** 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ -128.436 -10.157  -123.781 -12.002 
 (-1.50) (-1.80)*  (-1.29) (-2.05)** 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -264.073 -6.748  -108.057 -2.577 
 (-1.08) (-0.56)  (-0.34) (-0.19) 
𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -62.730 4.619  -33.303 4.846 
 (-1.01) (1.34)  (-0.44) (1.26) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.675 0.147  0.708 0.133 
 (0.93) (3.03)***  (1.02) (2.73)*** 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 0.344 0.069  0.010 0.056 
 (0.50) (1.73)*  (0.02) (1.53) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 -15.664 4.261  75.126 11.743 
 (-0.10) (0.33)  (0.50) (0.92) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 319.970 10.575  221.643 20.915 
 (1.55) (0.90)  (0.90) (1.05) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -416.407 -26.080  -373.438 -26.224 
 (-1.97)** (-2.27)**  (-1.86)* (-2.40)** 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 130.811 9.699  115.641 9.941 
 (1.50) (1.61)  (1.13) (1.49) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 19.726 -22.520  -69.099 -11.088 
 (0.07) (-1.14)  (-0.73) (-1.25) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -37.852 -8.763  -148.701 -25.406 
 (-0.47) (-1.03)  (-0.40) (-1.17) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 239.626 14.953  384.088 18.116 
 (1.78)* (1.60)  (2.54)** (1.85)* 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉 -154.155 11.095  -19.590 19.673 
 (-0.78) (0.78)  (-0.06) (0.79) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 14.242 -4.304  72.184 -2.111 
 (0.06) (-0.32)  (0.33) (-0.17) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ 44.229 10.480  23.213 12.766 
 (0.42) (0.60)  (0.21) (0.70) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 368.145 19.012  185.457 13.977 
 (0.97) (0.80)  (0.49) (0.59) 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 -152.583 -18.348  -205.093 -19.007 
 (-1.82)* (-3.39)***  (-2.13)** (-3.28)*** 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴.𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷.  0.172   0.179 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷. 0.125   0.120  
This Table measures the impact of themed sentiments on stock recommendations (Rec) and target price premia 
(TPrem). Rec is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 2 for a Buy, 1 for a Hold and 0 for a Sell 
recommendation. We use an ordinal logistic regression for the recommendation model. TPrem is a continuous 
variable and is calculated as the difference between the target price and the current market price scaled by the 
current market price. We estimate the target premium model by means of an OLS model. The independent 
variables are analysts’ negative sentiment scores for  industry and market environment (NegSIndEnv), 
management and strategy (NegSManStr), the macroeconomic and regulatory environment (NegSMacro), growth 
(NegSGrowth), financial position (NegSFinPos), and financial performance (NegSFinPerf). DCrisis and 
DPostCrisis are dummy variables which take a value of 1 when the report is written during the crisis (post 
crisis) period, and 0 otherwise. The reference category here is the pre-crisis period. The control variables are the 
natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LogMCap), the price to book ratio (PB), the return on common 
equity (ROE), and the debt to equity ratio (DebtEquity). For brevity, we only report significant control variables. 
The t-statistics (z-statistics for the ordinal regression) are given in parentheses, and ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The t-statistics (z-statistics) are calculated using White 
robust standard errors and are clustered by company to control for dependency in error terms. 
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